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The effects of global health initiatives on
country health systems: a review of the
evidence from HIV/AIDS control
Regien G Biesma,1* Ruairı´ Brugha,1,2 Andrew Harmer,2 Aisling Walsh,1 Neil Spicer2 and Gill Walt2
Accepted 20 April 2009
This paper reviews country-level evidence about the impact of global health
initiatives (GHIs), which have had profound effects on recipient country health
systems in middle and low income countries. We have selected three initiatives
that account for an estimated two-thirds of external funding earmarked for
HIV/AIDS control in resource-poor countries: the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
TB and Malaria, the World Bank Multi-country AIDS Program (MAP) and the
US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). This paper draws on
31 original country-specific and cross-country articles and reports, based on
country-level fieldwork conducted between 2002 and 2007. Positive effects have
included a rapid scale-up in HIV/AIDS service delivery, greater stakeholder
participation, and channelling of funds to non-governmental stakeholders,
mainly NGOs and faith-based bodies. Negative effects include distortion of
recipient countries’ national policies, notably through distracting governments
from coordinated efforts to strengthen health systems and re-verticalization
of planning, management and monitoring and evaluation systems. Sub-national
and district studies are needed to assess the degree to which GHIs are learning
to align with and build the capacities of countries to respond to HIV/AIDS;
whether marginalized populations access and benefit from GHI-funded
programmes; and about the cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability of
the HIV and AIDS programmes funded by the GHIs. Three multi-country sets
of evaluations, which will be reporting in 2009, will answer some of these
questions.
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Introduction
The past 10 years have witnessed a proliferation of what are
commonly called global health initiatives (GHIs). They were put
in place as an emergency response to accelerate the scale-up
of control of the major communicable diseases, especially
HIV/AIDS. GHIs are characterized by their ability to mobilize
huge levels of financial resources, linking inputs to perfor-
mance; and by the channelling of resources directly to non-
governmental civil society groups (Caines 2005). Three GHIs—
the World Bank’s Multi-country HIV/AIDS Programme (MAP),
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, and The
President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) (see
Table 1 for main features)—are contributing more than two-
thirds of all direct external funding to scaling up HIV/AIDS
prevention, treatment and care in resource-poor countries
(GFATM 2007; Oomman et al. 2007). They have leveraged
high-level political support for HIV/AIDS at the global level
and captured the attention of country-level stakeholders.
Surprisingly, predictions that GHIs were likely to have
profound effects on recipient country health systems (Brugha
and Walt 2001) remain only partially explored (Brugha 2008;
Yu et al. 2008), and speculation rather than systematic review of
evidence characterizes current understanding of this major shift
towards disease-specific funding, and its impact on health
systems in recipient countries. Analysis has focused most
closely on the Global Fund, and where analysis has been
conducted on MAP and PEPFAR, lessons learned have not
been collated and widely disseminated. The purpose of our
review, therefore, is to systematically review, discuss and
make recommendations for global and country policy makers
around future evidence needs, based on available empirical data
from countries on the specific effects on country health systems
of these three GHIs.
In this review, we follow Brugha (2008) where, based on
functions rather than governance structure, a GHI is defined as:
‘a blueprint for financing, resourcing, coordinating and/or
implementing disease control across at least several countries
in more than one region of the world’. According to this
definition, GHIs may be bilateral agency—government to
government—aid mechanisms, as in the case of PEPFAR;
they can be established by a multilateral agency, as in the case
of the World Bank’s MAP; or they may be public-private
partnerships, as in the case of the Global Fund. What
characterizes them as GHIs is that they use uniform approaches
to applying large levels of resources for HIV/AIDS control across
a range of different countries and regions.1 Our analysis of the
effects of GHIs on country health systems focuses primarily on
the effects that they have on those organizations, institutions
and resources that produce actions whose primary purpose is
to improve health (WHO 2000), which includes public, non-
profit and for-profit private sectors, as well as international and
bilateral donors, foundations and voluntary organizations
involved in funding or implementing health activities at central,
regional, district, community and/or household levels (Islam
2007).
Methods
Search strategy
In late 2007, we conducted a review of key documents, initially
using as search terms research themes derived from a three-
country study of the effects of the Global Fund (Stillman and
Bennett 2005) and a draft of a policy review on GHIs (Brugha
2008). These themes and the names of the three selected
GHIs were used as search terms for conducting a comprehen-
sive search of six databases (AIDS Portal, CAB Direct,
ELDIS, POPLINE, PubMed, and Web of Knowledge) for the
period 2002–07.2 We also performed internet searches for grey
literature, reviewing the websites of three global health
organizations (The World Bank’s Independent Evaluation
Group, the Global Fund Evaluation Library, and PEPFAR),
and the research archives of three global health research
institutes (Centre for Global Development, the UK Department
for International Development Health Resource Centre, and
Partnerships for Health Reform). Additional publications were
obtained through reference lists of identified papers and by
contacting key informants in the field.
Criteria for selection
Three authors examined the list of references generated by the
search and independently assessed the retrieved studies for
inclusion using the following criteria:
 Reports and papers must provide data about one or more
of the key research themes as it relates to one or more of
the three HIV/AIDS GHIs: Global Fund, PEPFAR or World
Bank MAP;
KEY MESSAGES
 Global health initiatives (GHIs) have enabled wider stakeholder participation in service delivery while often having
early negative systems effects through establishing parallel bodies and processes that are poorly coordinated,
harmonized and aligned with national systems.
 Over time, GHIs have learned to better utilize country systems and support national disease control efforts, while
making least progress in enabling countries to implement coordinated financial management and human resource
strategies.
 Independent longitudinal evaluations of GHIs are needed—especially at district, facility and community levels—to track
developments and provide timely information to recipient countries, GHIs, civil society organizations and development
agencies.
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 Reports and papers must present primary data collected at the
country level;
 There must be some outline of methods, i.e. some explanation
of how data were collected and analysed and how findings
were derived;
 The data are ‘original’. This might take the form of
(i) primary qualitative or quantitative research findings; and
(ii) external or internal multi-country evaluations of one or
more of the GHIs.
This review does not include broad overviews of secondary
material or ‘grey’ literature (for example, policy briefs, media
or journal ‘comments’). We excluded studies restricted to
data collection only at the global level, those based only on
secondary data, and reviews and commentaries. This was
sometimes a difficult judgement as some important reviews
contained or cited some relevant primary data, but were
excluded if these could not be directly sourced from papers
or reports in the public domain.
A health systems framework for GHIs
Drawing on the conceptual framework for analysing system-
wide effects of the Global Fund developed by Bennett and
Fairbank (2003) and selected national-level effects reported in
a policy review (Brugha 2008), a draft health systems frame-
work was developed. This was composed of three health
system’s functions: policy development, policy implementation
and service delivery. Given the lack of published evidence,
2002–07, on the effects of these GHIs on focal and non-focal
services, the framework was shortened and focused on specific
themes under policy development and policy implementation.
Policy development reflected global concerns around country
ownership, harmonization and alignment of global initiatives
with national priorities and policies, as expressed in the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005). Policy imple-
mentation explored four cross-cutting health systems themes:
coordination and planning, stakeholder engagement, monitor-
ing and evaluation, and human resources (see Table 2). As new
studies provide additional evidence, the framework can be
expanded to include GHI effects on infrastructure and avail-
ability of drugs and other equipment; on coverage, equity and
access to services; and the effects on non-focal, non-GHI
supported services. Under each of these themes, we first present
and interpret negative effects, which often correspond with
the early effects of the GHIs, followed by positive effects and
lessons learned by GHIs across this period.
Results
Description of studies
Thirty-one reports, where data were collected between 2002
and 2007, met the inclusion criteria (see Table 3). Some were
disseminated both as individual and as cross-country outputs,
notably the four-country Global Fund Tracking Study and the
four-country SWEF (System Wide Effects of the Fund) studies.
All were descriptive cross-sectional studies. A limited number
of studies in this review have collected data both at the
national and sub-national level, notably the SWEF study in
Georgia, Benin and Ethiopia (Curatio 2004; Banteyerga et al.
2006; Gbangbadthore et al. 2006) and some others (GFATM
2004; McKinsey 2005; Kelly et al. 2006). Most of the studies
included in this review used mainly or wholly qualitative
methods (in-depth interviews).
Table 1 Main characteristics and HIV/AIDS commitments from the three GHIs (in millions of constant US$)
World Bank MAP (IDA) Global Fund PEPFAR
Type of GHI Multilateral agency Public Private Partnership Bilateral donor
Start 2000 (fiscal year 2001) 2002 2003 (fiscal year 2004)
Focus disease HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria HIV/AIDS
Priority on Uses national AIDS strategic
plans for setting priorities
Flexible funding based on priorities
set by country stakeholders
Achieving programmatic targets
set by US Congress
Management system National AIDS Council (NAC)
and a NAC secretariat
Country Coordinating Mechanism
(CCM) and Local Fund Agents
US Global AIDS Coordinator
(OGAC)
Country teams coordinated
through US embassy
Funding allocation Earmarked funding based on
negotiations with
GovernmentþNAC
Performance-based funding of
successful proposals, can be
channelled through pooled
mechanisms
Pre-determined earmarked funding
Types of interventions funded Community responses and
capacity building
44% treatment
33% prevention
7% health systems strengthening
55% ARV treatment
20% prevention
10% OVCs
Principal recipients Multi-sectoral (different ministries
of) government, NAC, civil
society
Government, NAC, civil society Mainly international (often US)
NGOs, which fund local NGOs;
small grants to governments
Disbursement funding HIV/AIDS*
2003 307.7 789.1 949.2
2006 36.1 1031.3 2517.6
*Sources: OECD CRS database (last accessed 20 November 2008), Oomman et al. (2007).
GLOBAL HEALTH INITIATIVES AND HEALTH SYSTEMS 241
National policy development
Alignment to national policy, plans and priorities for health
Negative effects of all three GHIs were reported by most early
studies, including examples of how GHIs distracted govern-
ments from coordinated efforts to strengthen health systems
through distorting national priorities and through imposing
donor implementation conditions (Brugha et al. 2004; Grace
2004; World Bank 2004; McKinsey 2005; Stillman and Bennett
2005). The Global Fund aims to support programmes that
reflect local priorities and fit within existing country structures,
but in practice the extent to which this occurred varied widely
(Stillman and Bennett 2005). The Fund rejected Uganda’s
2002 Round One cross-cutting systems-strengthening proposal,
requiring Uganda to break it into disease-specific components
(Donoghue et al. 2005a). In response, the Government
established a discrete project management unit, which it and
its donor partners viewed in 2003 as a distortion of Uganda’s
policy of channelling all funds to support a coordinated
national health sector strategy. Pressure from World Health
Organization (WHO) consultants led to Tanzania applying for
Global Fund support for an anti-retroviral treatment pro-
gramme, in place of the government’s priority to fund a
programme on orphans and children (Starling et al. 2005a).
Concerns were reported about PEPFAR-imposed policy pre-
scriptions such as disallowing grant recipients from providing
counselling on abortion and promotion of abstinence-only
prevention approaches (ITPC 2005). An evaluation commis-
sioned by the US Congress reported that PEPFAR’s commit-
ment to country ownership had been undermined by its rigid
budget allocations to specific control measures (Sepulveda et al.
2007). Oomman et al. (2007) reported that PEPFAR’s funding
allocations were remarkably consistent despite epidemiological
and health systems’ differences across Mozambique, Uganda
and Zambia. This suggested that global earmarks and donor
conditionalities were driving funding allocations regardless of
countries’ diseases, health needs and priorities.
GHI-imposed priorities and funding decisions also reflected
country systems’ weaknesses. An evaluation of the World Bank
MAP reported that its approach was undermined by countries
lacking national plans that prioritized the components of an
HIV/AIDS programme according to their importance or antici-
pated effectiveness (OED 2005). In the early years of MAP,
most Ministries of Health had been slow to respond to the
HIV epidemic and some felt disempowered by MAP’s support
to a multisectoral response which channelled funds to other
ministries in the fight against AIDS (World Bank 2004). The
World Bank’s interim review found that governments’ multi-
sectoral response to the MAP had been disappointing. The
different ministries’ sectoral plans lacked inter-sectorality and
had not moved beyond their own workplace interventions to
consider programmes for their beneficiaries such as students
(Education) and farmers (Agriculture). Despite these early
concerns, MAP was evaluated in 2007 as having succeeded
in promoting a multisectoral response over the course of its
7 years (Gorgens-Albino et al. 2007), which corresponded with
positive findings from an independent study in Uganda
(Donoghue et al. 2005b) indicating that GHI approaches had
promoted lesson-learning by governments.
Global Fund and PEPFAR have also reportedly learned
lessons and modified their processes over time. Studies across
2002–07 suggest that the Global Fund was beginning to adapt
its early approach to fit with countries’ priorities for aligning
new funds with country systems. In 2006, it was seen as more
supportive of Ethiopia’s decentralization policies than in 2005
(Banteyerga et al. 2005; Banteyerga et al. 2006). A follow-up
study in Benin showed that the Global Fund was becoming
better aligned with Benin’s policies on partnership, although
the planning of activities remained top-down, which conflicted
with bottom-up processes supported by national health policy
(Gbangbadthore et al. 2006). The US evaluation reported that
recipient governments perceived PEPFAR’s Country Operational
Plans as becoming better aligned with national plans over
time (Sepulveda et al. 2007). In Mozambique, while PEPFAR
remained outside of the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) pooled
mechanism for funding the health and HIV/AIDS sectors, its
representatives did participate in the annual planning activities
Table 2 Framework for assessing the published effects of GHIs on national health systems
System strengthening area Sub-area
Selected determinants of the effects of GHIs
on health systems
Policy development National policy – Alignment to national policy, plans and priorities
for health
– Donor harmonization and aid mechanisms
Policy implementation Coordination and planning – Coordination and planning structures
– Coordination and planning processes
Widening stakeholder involvement – Engaging and funding civil society
– Multiple funding channels
Disbursement, absorptive capacity and management – Disbursement and absorptive capacity
– Programmatic and financial management
Monitoring & Evaluation – Monitoring and evaluation systems
Human resources – Health worker availability and migration
– Motivation and incentives
– Health worker training
Adapted from the SWEF framework by Bennett & Fairbank (2003) and Brugha (2008).
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Table 3 Included studies with main characteristics
Author (year) Focus GHI
Type of HIV/
AIDS epidemic Level Type of evaluation Evidence Design
Grace (2003) GF Mixed National Independent multi-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Brugha et al. (2004) GF Generalized National Independent multi-country evaluation Journal
article
Cross-sectional
GFATM (2004) GF Mixed National/
sub-national
Internal multi-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Kruse et al. (2004) GF Mixed National External multi-country evaluation
(funded by GF)
Report Cross-sectional
Curatio International
Foundation (2004)
GF Concentrated National/
sub-national
Independent single-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
World Bank (2004) MAP Generalized National Internal multi-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Doupe (2004) GF Mixed National Independent multi-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Starling et al. (2005a) GF Generalized National Independent single-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Starling et al. (2005b) GF Generalized National Independent single-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Donoghue et al. (2005a) GF Generalized National Independent single-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Donoghue et al. (2005b) GF Generalized National Independent single-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Brugha et al. (2005) GF Generalized National Independent multi-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
McKinsey & Company
(2005)
GF, GAVI,
MAP, PEPFAR
Mixed National/
sub-national
Independent multi-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Ainsworth et al. (2005) MAP Mixed National External multi-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Schott et al. (2005) GF Generalized National/
sub-national
Independent multi-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Mtonya et al. (2005) GF Generalized National/
sub-national
Independent single-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Banteyerga et al. (2005) GF Generalized National/
sub-national
Independent single-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Smith et al. (2005) GF Generalized National/
sub-national
Independent single-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Stillman et al. (2005) GF Generalized National/
sub-national
Independent multi-country evaluation Report Repeated
cross-sectionalþ
ITPC (2005) GF, PEPFAR,
World Bank
Mixed National/
sub-national
Independent multi-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Mtonya et al. (2006) GF Generalized National Independent single-country evaluation Report Repeated
cross-sectionalþ
Banteyerga et al. (2006) GF Generalized National/
sub-national
Independent single-country evaluation Report Repeated
cross-sectionalþ
Gbangbadthore´ et al.
(2006)
GF Generalized National/
sub-national
Independent single-country evaluation Report Repeated
cross-sectionalþ
Van Kerkhoff et al.
(2006)
GF Concentrated National Independent multi-country evaluation Journal
article
Cross-sectional
Kelly et al. (2006) GF Generalized National/
sub-national
External single-country evaluation
(funded by GF)
Report Cross-sectional
Drew et al. (2006) GF Concentrated National Independent multi-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Wilkinson et al. (2006) GF Mixed National External multi-country evaluation
(funded by GF)
Report Cross-sectional
Sepulveda et al. (2007) PEPFAR Generalized National External multi-country evaluation
(funded by US Department of State)
Report Cross-sectional
Oomman et al. (2007) PEPFAR,
GF, MAP
Generalized National Independent multi-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
Euro Health Group
(2007)
GF Anonymous
countries
National External multi-country evaluation
(funded by GF)
Report Cross-sectional
Gorgens-Albino et al.
(2007)
World Bank
MAP
Generalized National Internal multi-country evaluation Report Cross-sectional
GF¼Global Fund.
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undertaken by the Ministry of Health and National AIDS
Council (Oomman et al. 2007). In Ethiopia, PEPFAR was
working with the government to align with its priorities,
although it was channelling its funds to its preferred
implementing partners (Banteyerga 2006).
Donor harmonization and aid mechanisms
Negative effects on donor harmonization were reported in
the early years of the GHIs. Those such as the Global Fund
that lacked a country presence were radically new financing
mechanisms in the international aid architecture; and they
had not agreed with partners about their respective roles and
responsibilities (McKinsey 2005). Although all of these GHIs
had stated their willingness to harmonize their activities with
other partners, the reality was often different. For example,
the World Bank’s review of MAP recommended that it and
other donors should adopt ‘The Three Ones’ principles of
harmonization: one strategic framework, one national authority
and one monitoring and evaluation system for HIV/AIDS
(World Bank 2004). However, MAP projects themselves
continued to burden government officials with extensive and
complex procedural and reporting requirements (Oomman et al.
2007).
An early synthesis of studies compiled by the Global Fund
reported little harmonization between the Global Fund and
pre-existing planning and funding mechanisms, such as SWAps
and joint interagency committees (GFATM 2004). Later,
Wilkinson et al. (2006) reported variable experiences of the
Global Fund across different countries. While it supported
donor harmonization and alignment efforts in Cambodia,
Nigeria and Namibia, it was reportedly undermining these
efforts in Sri Lanka and Cameroon, through requiring separate
reporting systems with associated transaction costs. PEPFAR’s
requirement of US Federal Drugs Administration approval of
antiretroviral drugs has prevented it relying on the WHO
prequalification for quality assurance on which most donors
and countries rely (Sepulveda et al. 2007). Other barriers to
harmonization and collective donor action have included
PEPFAR’s requirement that results be attributable to its
inputs, and its lack of transparency and unwillingness to
involve other donors in its own annual planning processes,
which have been considered procurement-sensitive (Sepulveda
et al. 2007).
There is evidence, over time, that the GHIs—especially the
Global Fund—have learned lessons and begun to harmonize
their approaches and align them with governments. Follow-up
studies across 2004 and 2005 in Benin and Ethiopia, where the
Global Fund and PEPFAR signed a memorandum of under-
standing, reported significant improvements in GHI harmoniza-
tion (Stillman and Bennett 2005; Banteyerga 2006). The Global
Fund’s agreement in 2004 to allow its funds be channelled
through Mozambique’s SWAp, the Common Fund, was seen as
a pioneering example of how disease-specific programmes can
learn to adapt to and strengthen country systems (McKinsey
2005). In Mozambique, the World Bank MAP followed the
Global Fund’s lead, but PEPFAR remained outside of the
SWAp as PEPFAR does not support Ministry of Finance fund
management processes (McKinsey 2005; Oomman et al. 2007).
However, despite not being able to contribute funds directly
to the SWAp, it had become an active participant in donor
partnerships that aimed to harmonize donor and country
activities (Oomman et al. 2007).
The integration of Global Fund support into Malawi’s SWAp
to fund its integrated service delivery approach was perceived
as positive for its sustainability (Mtonya and Chizimbi 2006).
The MAP mainly focused its harmonization activities through
National AIDS Councils (NACs), where it contributed to
pooled-funding to the NAC’s Integrated Annual Work Plan
for 2003–2008 (Mtonya and Chizimbi 2006). In other countries,
MAP has contributed funds to support implementation of
Global Fund plans, and several MAP projects have implemented
joint supervision missions (Gorgens-Albino et al. 2007).
Policy implementation
Coordination and planning structures
The three-disease focus of the Global Fund has required the
establishment of a new planning structure: the Country
Coordination Mechanism (CCM); and coordination has con-
tinued to be a contentious issue for national planners
(Wilkinson et al. 2006). The result has been duplication in
planning for HIV/AIDS control, between CCMs and national
AIDS councils. In Uganda, this led to competition between
the MoH and the Uganda AIDS Commission for control and
funds (Donoghue et al. 2005b). In Malawi, it was reported that
there were parallel planning structures for the NAC Integrated
National Work Plan and the SWAp Programme of Work,
which Global Fund support had aggravated (Mtonya and
Chizimbi 2006). The McKinsey study (2005) found that in
Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo there were at
least four committees overseeing HIV/AIDS control, with little
communication between them about their activities.
Respondents in Angola believed there were too many coordi-
nating bodies that did not meet the country’s needs (McKinsey
2005).
The World Bank, which endorsed the UNAIDS ‘Three Ones’
principles, had a simpler task in that it worked with existing
national AIDS councils (OED 2005). However, several studies
reported longstanding weaknesses in NACs, which have not
provided consistent leadership and oversight (Donoghue et al.
2005a; ITPC 2005; Starling et al. 2005a). Their secretariats have
often become implementation agencies rather than coordinators
and facilitators (World Bank 2004). One three-country study
reported that preparation of annual country operational plans,
a condition of PEPFAR support, consumed considerable time
and effort of recipient organizations in Uganda, Zambia and
Mozambique (Oomman et al. 2007). While duplication of plan-
ning structures has persisted, some positive effects of GHIs on
coordination and planning have been reported. In Malawi, after
a USAID policy project study in 2004 had pointed to the
multiplicity of HIV/AIDS coordinating structures, the Malawi
Partnership Forum was created in 2005 as a central coordina-
tion structure overarching all existing mechanisms (Mtonya
and Chizimbi 2006).
Coordination and planning processes
Several studies have reported systemic weaknesses in CCM
governance, such as suboptimal communication between its
members, and a lack of trust between government and
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non-government sectors (Brugha et al. 2004; Curatio 2004;
Doupe 2004; GFATM 2004; Grace 2004; Brugha et al. 2005;
Donoghue et al. 2005a; ITPC 2005; Starling et al. 2005a; Stillman
and Bennett 2005; Kelly et al. 2006; Wilkinson et al. 2006).
Often CCMs were too large and unwieldy, which detracted from
efficient functioning (Doupe 2004; Grace 2004). Concerns
emerged in 2004 about the degree of participation and the
capacity of Mozambique’s CCM to adapt to its new role in
overseeing Principal Recipient activities, in that the two
principal recipients of funding were bodies represented by the
Chair and Vice-Chair of the CCM (Starling et al. 2005b). Similar
concerns were also reported in Uganda with regard to the CCM
Chair influencing the selection of its own constituency as the
principal recipient of funds (Donoghue et al. 2005b). However,
comparable evidence of the effects of the MAP and PEPFAR
on planning processes is lacking, reflecting PEPFAR’s lack of
transparency; and because the World Bank has traditionally
negotiated directly with government behind closed doors.
GHI requirements and feed-back have also had positive
effects on planning capacity (McKinsey 2005). In Georgia and
China, feedback on the country proposals enhanced their
capacity to plan and anticipate future needs (Curatio 2004;
van Kerkhoff and Szlezak 2006). In Angola, which had recently
emerged from conflict and where the risk of HIV/AIDS
transmission was increasing, Global Fund and World Bank
support was seen as critical in identifying appropriate measures
for control of the epidemic (McKinsey 2005).
Widening stakeholder involvement: engaging and funding
civil society
All three GHIs, most visibly the Global Fund through its
CCMs, have boosted stakeholder engagement. However, several
negative early effects were reported, which stemmed partly
from government responses to these new ways of working.
In 2002–04, some governments were perceived to be controlling
the Global Fund processes and marginalizing civil society
(Brugha et al. 2004; Grace 2004). Several studies reported
problems in CCM constituencies, such as reluctance by
government-dominated CCMs to include strong non-govern-
mental partners (including the private for-profit sector), strong
advocates for communities living with AIDS, geographical
representation and strong technical expertise (Curatio 2004;
Doupe 2004; GFATM 2004; Brugha et al. 2005; Donoghue et al.
2005a; ITPC 2005; Starling et al. 2005a; Stillman and Bennett
2005; Kelly et al. 2006). As a result, the Global Fund introduced
tighter conditions, stipulating that CCMs, which prepare
proposals and apply for funds, must include these sectors
(Wilkinson et al. 2006).
Despite early problems, GHIs have been more effective
than other financing mechanisms in diversifying stakeholder
participation and involving NGOs and faith-based organizations
(FBOs), enabling them to gain direct access to financial
resources (GFATM 2004; OED 2004; McKinsey 2005;
Wilkinson et al. 2006). MAP has expanded the scope and
range of FBO and community responses to the HIV epidemic
(Gorgens-Albino et al. 2007; Oomman et al. 2007). However,
little published evidence was found on how communities’
planning capacity was strengthened. PEPFAR’s focus on civil
society has been at the expense of building government
capacity and through heavy use of US NGOs (Oomman et al.
2007). A follow-up survey in Benin showed that the Global
Fund CCM had become more pro-active since the baseline
survey by including a broader range of stakeholders
(Gbangbadthore et al. 2006). In Malawi, Benin and Zambia,
the new opportunities provided by the Global Fund strength-
ened public/private collaborations, through NGOs establishing
umbrella organizations that helped to channel funds through
principal recipients to sub-recipients (Donoghue et al. 2005a;
Mtonya et al. 2005; Smith et al. 2005; Stillman and Bennett
2005). This also served to improve the capacity of local district
structures, local NGOs and community groups.
Widening stakeholder involvement: multiple funding channels
Several studies report that GHIs, which focus on the same
diseases, channel funds through many different routes, both
within and outside the public sector. While there are clear
advantages to involving a greater diversity of actors, many
countries have found it difficult to cope with the complexity.
For example, in Angola MAP channelled funds through the
Ministry of Planning rather than the Ministry of Health, which
was the usual channel, and the Global Fund did so through the
United Nations Development Programme, UNDP (McKinsey
2005). PEPFAR, on the other hand, has chosen to channel its
funds outside the public sector, mainly through international
(often US-based) NGOs. These NGOs then fund country-based
civil society and faith-based groups (Oomman et al. 2007).
There were concerns in South Africa, Uganda, Benin, Ethiopia
and Malawi about the rapid growth of the NGO sector, where
many new NGOs were seen as having limited capacity and were
only weakly accountable (Donoghue et al. 2005b; Bennett et al.
2006; Kelly et al. 2006). These studies concluded that too
little attention was paid to strengthening community-level
systems and to ensuring adequate regulation or quality control
in the non-public sector. There has been minimal reported
involvement of the private for-profit sector in GHI processes
and in receipt of funds, apart from the Global Fund in Malawi
where private clinics were allocated free antiretroviral drugs
(Stillman and Bennett 2005).
Despite concerns about capacity, it has been accepted almost
universally as a positive feature of the GHIs that they all
have disbursed significant funds to civil society. The Global
Fund mandated that 30% of all grants should be allocated to
civil society groups (Wilkinson et al. 2006); and the SWEF and
Tracking Studies reported early evidence that the Global Fund
was achieving this objective (Banteyerga et al. 2005; Donohoe
et al. 2005a; Mtonya et al. 2005; Smith et al. 2005).
Disbursement, absorption and management of GHI funds:
disbursement and absorptive capacity
From 2002 to 2007, countries reported that the combination of
different fiscal years, the different disbursement mechanisms
of the three GHIs and unpredictable disbursement had made
it difficult for countries to draw down funds and integrate
these resources into coordinated national plans (Brugha et al.
2004; Grace 2004; Stillman and Bennett 2005; McKinsey
2005; Wilkinson et al. 2006; Oomman et al. 2007). Tanzania
experienced quite similar problems in drawing down MAP and
later Global Fund money; and respondents commented on the
lack of lesson-learning across GHIs (Starling et al. 2005a). In
the Global Fund Tracking Studies (2003–04) and baseline
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SWEF studies (2004–05), countries reported immense pressure
due to the Global Fund’s performance-based disbursement
conditions (Brugha et al. 2004; Stillman and Bennett 2005).
Such conditions were not seen as inherently wrong, but as
compounding problems of low absorptive capacity due to weak
country budgetary systems and incompatible donor systems
(ITPC 2005; McKinsey 2005). In Ethiopia, weak government
plans were seen as not providing a solid base for guiding Global
Fund-supported activities (Banteyerga et al. 2005). In Laos, the
Global Fund delayed disbursements until the country resolved
its financial, monitoring and evaluation systems’ weaknesses
(McKinsey 2005). Lack of a country presence (a key feature
of the Global Fund), and the slowness of it and its global
multilateral and bilateral partners to respond to the need for
stronger technical support to countries, often delayed and
impaired grant implementation (Wilkinson et al. 2006).
On the positive side, evidence has shown that over the years
2002–07, the three GHIs have significantly increased total
aid flows in the areas of the focal diseases (Gorgens-Albino
et al. 2007; Oomman et al. 2007; Sepulveda et al. 2007). GHIs
have been achieving their objective of prioritizing and funding
the control of major diseases that were previously under-
resourced (McKinsey 2005). In Benin, the Global Fund raised
the overall budget for health spending by about 15%
(Gbangbadthore et al. 2006). In the early 2000s, MAP made
large commitments to HIV and AIDS control in advance
of other donors with US$1 billion being fully committed by
2004 (Gorgens-Albino et al. 2007). Since 2004, MAP funding
has been more moderate, while the Global Fund and in
particular PEPFAR have increased their funding dramatically,
as reported for Mozambique, Uganda and Malawi (Oomman
et al. 2007). PEPFAR has disbursed more quickly than the
Global Fund and MAP, partly by working outside of and
making little effort to build government systems, which have
been slower to draw down funds than non-government
recipients (Stillman and Bennett 2005; Oomman et al. 2007).
However, PEPFAR has provided countries with the least
flexibility in how funds could be used, whereas the Global
Fund has been seen as willing to fund gaps (Oomman et al.
2007).
Disbursement, absorption and management of GHI funds:
financial management
Several studies have reported GHI-imposed duplication and
parallelism in financial and programmatic management sys-
tems and cycles, which have created fragmentation and
increased the administrative burden for already overloaded
staff (Brugha et al. 2004; Grace 2004; Brugha et al. 2005;
McKinsey 2005; Stillman and Bennett 2005; Oomman et al.
2007). Although separate systems for financing were sometimes
justified, GHIs differed in efforts to use existing systems
and/or to improve the capacity of recipient organizations.
The stringent World Bank MAP requirements have often led
to the establishment of new financial management systems
rather than using standard government systems. However, the
World Bank MAP projects have made progress in building
reliable country systems for financial management. Specific
project staff, who sit within government ministries, were hired
to oversee grant implementation and to train government staff
in MAP-specific procedures (Oomman et al. 2007). PEPFAR, in
their function as an emergency response, required recipient
organizations that were able to manage funding efficiently
and implement fast. Often they have channelled funding
outside of the government system, following PEPFAR-specific
accounting and reporting procedures, while they relied on
their recipient organizations to build the capacity of the govern-
ment and other local organizations (Oomman et al. 2007). The
Global Fund has continued to utilize an independent Local
Fund Agent (LFA) financial management and audit model.
However, evaluations of the LFA system reported that, in
practice, LFAs have often not been well aligned with govern-
ment systems. Frequently they have lacked programmatic skills
and have been unable to mobilize and work in partnership with
other country partners (Kruse and Claussen 2004; Euro Health
Group 2007). Recently, the Global Fund has been aiming to
strengthen its LFA system through providing more comprehen-
sive tools and guidelines for recipient (and sub-recipient)
organizations (Euro Health Group 2007). However, evaluations
of GHIs across 2002–07 have reported little progress in reducing
GHI systems’ duplications.
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
Parallel systems and processes established by new GHIs contra-
vene the Paris Principles of Aid Effectiveness, often bypassing
countries’ own systems, and result in avoidable transaction
costs (McKinsey 2005). However, M&E requirements of GHIs
have often not been streamlined and, as a result, it is generally
reported in national studies that managers, at the national
and district levels, have to prepare multiple M&E reports,
in different formats and with different deadlines for the differ-
ent donors of their programmes. In some cases, additional
indicators have been required that were not part of countries’
own systems (McKinsey 2005).
PEPFAR, which operates outside government systems, has
continued to use project approaches and expects reporting to
be carried out according its formats (Oomman et al. 2007).
Several studies reported contrasting perceptions of Global Fund
alignment with existing country M&E systems (Brugha et al.
2005; Wilkinson et al. 2006). In Cambodia, Uganda and
Cameroon, the use of Global Fund project-related monitoring
tools undermined national programmes and the ‘Three Ones’
principle of a single M&E system.
The M&E emphasis of the first generation of the World Bank
supported AIDS projects was on monitoring as opposed to
evaluation, but was often poorly designed, under-implemented
and under-supervised (OED 2005). Informants in Tanzania,
Malawi, Uganda and Mozambique also expressed concern
about weak local M&E capacity or weak systems for monitoring
GHI funds and were sceptical of their countries’ ability to
demonstrate that they had met agreed targets (Brugha et al.
2005). Consequently, GHIs were encountering weak M&E
systems and putting in place GHI-specific measures to address
these weaknesses.
Improvements over time have been reported in that GHIs
have started to work with countries on developing and
strengthening their M&E systems (McKinsey 2005). In Sri
Lanka and Nigeria, Global Fund indicators fitted with the
national programme indicators and national M&E activities
(Wilkinson et al. 2006). The follow-up SWEF studies in Ethiopia
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and Malawi in 2005–06 reported some improvements in
integration, alignment and performance assessment since the
baseline studies, one year earlier (Stillman and Bennett 2005).
Recently, the World Bank developed an operational guide for
programme M&E and put in place M&E country assistance
capacity in the form of the Global Monitoring and Evaluation
Support Team (GAMET), based at the World Bank (Gorgens-
Albino et al. 2007). Recent findings show that PEPFAR has
been supporting building local capacity for collecting, synthe-
sizing and reporting on HIV/AIDS data through skills training,
development of health information systems, and technical
assistance, although neglecting or avoiding the strengthening
of national systems (Sepulveda et al. 2007).
Human resources for health: availability of health workers
Shortage of trained staff was reported in early country studies
as a major barrier to health systems, and GHI efforts to
scale-up antiretroviral treatment services in particular (Grace
2004; Brugha et al. 2005; Mtonya et al. 2005). In 2002–04 in
Zambia, it was reported that sufficient numbers of health
workers were not being trained to compensate for losses due
to illness, death from AIDS, and emigration (Donoghue et al.
2005a). Both Malawi and Kenya reported public sector health
worker shortages, which key informants believed would be
aggravated by selectively investing in health workers to work
in GHI-funded programmes for control of focal diseases such
as HIV/AIDS (World Bank 2004; Mtonya et al. 2005). Migration
of personnel from reproductive health and family planning
through re-allocation to ‘follow the money of the Global Fund’
was reported in 2005–06 (Schott et al. 2005; Gbangbadthore
et al. 2006; Wilkinson et al. 2006). In Ethiopia, Global Fund
supported activities were inducing health workers to move
away from the public to the private sector, NGOs and bilateral
agencies (Banteyerga et al. 2005). The follow-up component
of the study suggested this had worsened (Banteyerga et al.
2006). The nature of human resource problems varied, with
shifts of health workers from public to donor supported
projects/programmes as well as to other countries, causing
both internal and external ‘brain drain’ (Sepulveda et al. 2007).
However, national key informants perceived that the broader
donor community and GHIs acted similarly in initiating projects
that poached qualified staff from routine government pro-
grammes and employment, by offering them incentives or
higher salaries (Donoghue et al. 2005a; Drew and Purvis 2006).
Over time, positive responses to (partly GHI-induced) health
worker shortages were reported. The follow-up study in
Ethiopia found that the government had put in place a
human resource strategy, which included increases in salaries
and incentives to keep health workers in the public sector
(Banteyerga et al. 2006). PEPFAR has supported a number of
activities focused on retention of health workers, providing
physicians working in rural areas with better working and
living conditions such as housing, transportation, hardship
allowances and educational stipends for their children
(Sepulveda et al. 2007). Malawi’s Global Fund Round 5 proposal
addressed health worker distribution through aiming to
increase community-based services by recruiting, training and
retaining Health Surveillance Assistants (HSAs) to assist in
scaling up antiretrovirals (Mtonya et al. 2005). In Benin, the
Global Fund was reported to have strengthened infrastructure
and provided equipment that health workers needed to better
perform their tasks (Gbangbadthore et al. 2006).
Human resources for health: workload, motivation and
incentives
The combination of the additional workload, which GHI
funding has facilitated, and restrictions on public health
staffing levels and remuneration have increased the strain on
public sector health workers. This has been further exacerbated
when GHI-funded activities accelerated staff leakage to the
private sector. In Benin, it was reported that workers already
working in the public sector earned no additional pay despite
the extra work due to the Global Fund. However, programmes
that hired health workers directly with Global Fund money
were receiving higher salaries (Smith et al. 2005). The 2003–04
studies in Zambia and Mozambique reported that the inability
to use Global Fund support to supplement the salaries of
government staff running HIV programmes—most funds were
going to support programme activities and purchase commod-
ities—was de-motivating staff (Donoghue et al. 2005a; Starling
et al. 2005b). The early focus of PEPFAR was to strengthen the
skills of existing health workers to provide HIV care and
treatment services and, similar to the Global Fund, funding
could not be used to top-up the salaries of existing public sector
staff or to hire additional staff (Sepulveda et al. 2007). However,
in Uganda, the salaries of staff hired by NGOs were supported
by PEPAR funds, which enabled them to attract the best health
workers from the public sector (Oomman et al. 2007). MAP
funding could be used for salary top-ups but only at the district
government level (Oomman et al. 2007).
The studies reviewed here (2002–07) showed little evidence
that the early GHI-funded programmes had addressed issues of
workload and motivation. Where there were pre-existing
shortages of health workers, GHI-supported activities were
overburdening already limited capacity. The evidence suggests
that the Global Fund has changed its conditions over time.
Mozambique’s 2002 Round 2 request for salary support for
scaling up the numbers of health workers to deliver its TB
control programme was rejected by the Fund (Starling et al.
2005b). In contrast, in Malawi a Round 1 Global Fund grant
was re-allocated 3 years later in 2005 to increase all health
worker salaries, at the request of the government and other
donors (Stillman and Bennett 2005).
Human resources for health: training
Early studies of the Global Fund anticipated adverse effects as
ministries of health were under pressure to spend large
amounts of money quickly, for example on training workshops,
and health workers were relying on per diem allowances to
supplement salaries (GFATM 2004; Brugha et al. 2005; Stillman
and Bennett 2005). Most training focused largely on improving
clinical skills, while planning and managerial skills, critical to
successful implementation, were often neglected (McKinsey
2005; Stillman and Bennett 2005; Drew and Purvis 2006). In
Benin, there were early missed opportunities to use Global
Fund money to develop generic and transferable skills, such as
management, monitoring and evaluation (Smith 2005).
In general, the increase in funding for training has been
reported as a positive effect of GHIs. The Global Fund has
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allowed recipients to determine their own needs in capacity
building (Oomman et al. 2007). In Ethiopia, the Global Fund
supported the scale up training of multiple cadres, such as
nurses, health officers, laboratory technicians and health
extension workers (Banteyerga et al. 2005). In Benin, some
Global Fund training provided skills transferable to disease
programmes beyond the three focal diseases (Smith et al. 2005).
PEPFAR typically supported capacity-building activities focused
on training of existing personnel as an approach to addressing
the shortage in human resources (Sepulveda et al. 2007). For
example, in Uganda it funded the training of teachers to
implement revised school curricula on HIV/AIDS and technical
assistance for the district AIDS committees to generate HIV/
AIDS strategic plans for the districts (Oomman et al. 2007).
Oomman et al. (2007) reports that PEPFAR plans for 2008
would focus on building local capacity and a substantial
amount of targets are focused on training new health workers.
The capacity-building activities of the World Bank’s MAP
have focused on national government, civil society organiza-
tions, district government and in particular on the community
level; and have generally been seen as positive (Oomman et al.
2007). They have concentrated on management, administration,
finance and implementation skills, although most involved
short-term training. MAP was the first donor to channel a
substantial amount of funding to the community level and
build local capacity. In Zambia, key informants were positive
about the community-response component of the MAP project
(Oomman et al. 2007). More research is needed to determine
the effect of these GHI-funded activities on human resource
capacity and retention at the service delivery level in recipient
countries.
Discussion
Interpreting the evidence
This study has reviewed the literature on the effects of three
GHIs on country health systems with respect to: 1) national
policy; 2) coordination and planning; 3) stakeholder involve-
ment; 4) disbursement, absorptive capacity and management;
5) monitoring & evaluation; and 6) human resources. This
section discusses the major strengths and limitations of the
quality of available evidence which is of importance when
interpreting the results.
The major strength and rationale for this paper is that it has
taken a systematic approach to selecting and reviewing the
evidence of the health systems effects of specific GHIs in what
has become a politically-charged arena. A recent review by Yu
et al. (2008), on the effects on health systems of HIV/AIDS
funding more generally, has cited press releases and GHI
assertions, as well as commissioned evaluations, when attribut-
ing effects to GHI funding. Studies that look more broadly at
the effects of increased funding to HIV/AIDS control are also
less likely to shed light on the specific health systems effects
and the particular strengths and weaknesses of different GHIs.
The chapter by Brugha (2008) was not a systematic review and
aimed to draw out the policy processes involved and policy
lessons learned since the emergence of GHIs, rather than to
review their effects on health systems. The framework that has
been applied here is derived from early country experiences in
managing GHIs, experiences that are not adequately captured
in WHO’s health systems building blocks frameworks (WHO
2007). The review provides an historical backdrop to forth-
coming district-level studies; but also points to some chronic,
refractory problems at the national level, which are inherent in
the incentive systems underlying disease-specific initiatives.
Despite our systematic approach, the available evidence in
this review has several limitations. First, most studies have
focused on the national level, where GHI effects are initially
felt. There was little empirical evidence (and much conjecture)
regarding their effects at the district, facility and community
levels. It is here that the strengths, weaknesses and added value
(or not) of these still new, disease-specific initiatives will play
out and will need to be assessed.
Secondly, with a few exceptions, most were descriptive
studies with a cross-sectional design, which limits their capacity
to demonstrate changes over time. GHIs have evolved and have
sometimes been quite adept in learning and applying lessons,
which has been more evident with the Global Fund than with
PEPFAR. Rapid lesson-learning has meant that some study
findings quickly become outdated or new problems supersede
old ones.
Thirdly, not all GHIs and regions of the world have been
studied equally. The Global Fund, because of its visibility and
transparency, has been evaluated most often, whereas PEPFAR
has remained the most opaque of these GHIs. Moreover, the
limited empirical evidence on MAP, Global Fund and PEPFAR
country-level effects relied heavily on evaluations conducted or
commissioned by—or on behalf of—these initiatives, which
may affect their validity. Most evidence is also based on studies
conducted in sub-Saharan Africa, which is naturally the priority
region for three HIV/AIDS-focused GHIs.
Lastly, mainly because this review relied heavily on unpub-
lished reports (‘grey literature’), appraisal of the quality of data
collection and interpretation was hampered by limited informa-
tion on methods, quality control and analysis. Furthermore, the
lack of consensus on appropriate criteria for assessing qualita-
tive research (Dixon-Woods et al. 2004; Goldsmith et al. 2007)
precluded us from making formal judgements on the quality of
the studies.
Conclusions and recommendations
This review has contributed to the surprisingly thin body of
evidence regarding the health systems effects of three major
GHIs. The systematic approach adopted has produced a series of
findings that are of relevance to the current international
debate on this issue. Based on the findings presented above,
conclusions and recommendations are proposed that are
relevant to national and international policy makers, donors,
researchers and indeed civil society organizations.
Overall, the findings of this review of studies published
between 2002 and 2007 suggest that the three GHIs initially
often had negative effects, and later—as they learned lessons—
more often positive effects on health systems. They also had
different effects. From its outset, MAP was viewed positively for
its capacity-building activities at national and district public-
sector levels, and particularly at the community level. The
Global Fund’s particular strength has been in boosting the
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engagement of NGOs and faith-based bodies, bringing them
into planning structures with government and enabling them to
access significant funds. PEPFAR is well regarded for its fast
and predictable disbursement of funding to civil society
implementers.
At the level of national policy development, GHIs have generally
made most progress in aligning with national joint strategic
planning processes, while harmonization of activities with other
partners has remained a challenge. Effects on other national
health priorities, such as family planning and maternal care,
were not reported and will require district and facility studies to
assess effects at the service delivery level. While the Global
Fund supported, with variable success, programmes that
reflected local priorities and country ownership, PEPFAR’s
rigid budget allocations were more difficult to fit to a country’s
own priorities for health.
MAP’s support to a multisectoral response has been most
hindered by the weak capacity and lack of intersectorality of
recipient country ministries, which supports the hypothesis that
GHIs reveal rather than cause country systems weaknesses.
Indeed, GHIs did not initially consider health systems
strengthening to be part of their mandate but are now more
willing to address systems weaknesses (Brugha et al. 2005;
McKinsey 2005). This is all the more important now because,
due to the rapid GHI-supported scaling up of HIV care and
treatment in low income countries, HIV and AIDS are being
transformed from an epidemic emergency to an endemic
manageable chronic disease. As such, HIV control will require
health systems that support continuity of care and the retention
and follow up of patients with multiple and multi-systems
diseases (El-Sadr and Abrams 2007).
Despite some positive developments, such as the integration
of Global Fund support into some countries’ SWAps, donor
harmonization activities have continued to fall short. While the
vertical funding, planning and performance monitoring
approaches that have characterized the GHIs could be seen as
more efficient responses to tackling disease emergencies, these
approaches created substantial barriers to harmonizing donor
activities. They also reflected GHIs’ inherent need to demon-
strate value for money through donor-specific measurements of
performance. More recently, the GHIs have retreated from
making claims of initiative-specific attributable successes
(Brugha 2007; Gorgens-Albino et al. 2007), acknowledging the
interplay of the many inputs and factors affecting programme
implementation and service delivery. This was probably in
response to the inherent difficulties of attribution in the
complex multi-funded terrain of African health systems
(Bennett et al. 2006). It also reflected a change in the global
development assistance climate in the light of the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005).
However, it is at the national policy implementation level where
the main early effects of GHIs—often negative at first and
subsequently positive—have been encountered and documen-
ted. GHIs have led to multiple and parallel coordinating bodies,
such as Global Fund CCMs, that have conflicted and sometimes
contested with pre-existing bodies such as National AIDS
Councils. Often, neither was providing the necessary leadership
and oversight. Others, such as PEPFAR, established and
continued to use parallel planning processes, inevitably pulling
governments and other implementers away from other impor-
tant activities because of the volume of funds at stake.
However, positive effects have followed negative ones in that
CCMs have enabled substantial improvements in stakeholder
participation in the health sector. Through all three GHIs, NGOs
and faith-based organizations have become direct recipients
of significant levels of funding and thereby additional
programme implementers. While there are great advantages
to involving a greater diversity of actors, these new sources
of funds have provoked real tensions in resource-starved
settings between governments, as the traditional recipients
of donor aid, and new civil society implementing organizations.
Emerging evidence suggests that GHIs, which have been
either geographically or ideologically detached from
these concerns, have not done enough to help manage these
tensions.
Where GHIs have been most retrograde has been in main-
taining their own fiscal cycles, systems for auditing expendi-
ture and GHI-specific reporting requirements. There have
been gradual efforts to reduce transaction costs for countries.
For example, the Global Fund has shown a willingness (in
principle, at least) to adapt and align with country systems
and directly fund countries’ national disease control plans,
for example through ‘rolling continuation channels’ (GFATM
2007). However, it has continued to utilize a non-aligned
Local Fund Agent model for financial management and
audit (GFATM 2008b). More recently, GHIs have started
to work with countries in strengthening monitoring and
evaluation systems and increasing local capacity, although
this has mainly been for HIV/AIDS programmes and
strengthening of the wider national health system has been
neglected.
Finally, the effective implementation of GHI-supported
programmes depends on human resources, which are recognized
as the main bottleneck to scaling-up service delivery, especially
in sub-Saharan Africa. There were credible, if anecdotal, early
reports that different funding sources were competing for a
limited pool of health workers by offering them incentives or
higher salaries, which accelerated public sector staff leakage to
non-government sectors. The combination of additional work-
load and remuneration constraints led to de-motivated and
overburdened health workers in the public sector. One of the
reasons was that GHI requirements in the early years, except
to some extent MAP, precluded the funding of salaries for
additional public sector health workers. Countries have also
invested heavily in writing funding applications, whereas
capacity for implementation of GHI-funded programmes has
often been lacking. The early studies reviewed here suggest that
the Global Fund and PEPFAR limited their human capacity-
building activities to training existing health care workers,
while MAP undertook a wider approach to capacity building at
national and community levels. However, again, emerging
evidence suggests that GHIs have been increasingly recognizing
the importance of focusing attention on (and funding for)
training and improving work and living conditions of health
workers in rural areas as retention strategies.
The principal recommendation to GHIs, recipient donor
countries, civil society organizations and technical agencies
alike is to engage more fully with the Paris Principles for Aid
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Effectiveness as an important step in maximizing positive and
minimizing negative effects of their programmes:
1. GHIs, which have signed up to these principles, could do
much more to promote country ownership through aligning
their objectives with comprehensive national health (rather
than only HIV/AIDS) priorities.
2. Coordinated GHI investment to strengthen the capacity
of national systems for financial management, M&E
and reporting could thereby give GHIs the confidence to
harmonize, align and use these systems.
3. There is an obvious need for stronger coordination of
donor investments to support countries’ national strategic
health plans, which can include flexibility to allow GHIs
and other donors to support specific components of such
plans.
4. GHIs should give recipient countries sufficient flexibility to
address systems’ weaknesses and strengthen implementa-
tion capacity, especially in human resources at all levels.
5. Public sector health worker shortages, recognized as the key
determinant for wide-ranging efforts to scale-up health-
related priority interventions, should be addressed by GHIs
through providing long-term funding for additional human
resources for the health sector.
6. GHIs should continue to encourage the participation of
non-government as well as government stakeholders, while
reducing tensions created by funding new implementers
in service delivery by requiring them, as far as possible,
to utilize and contribute data to national information
systems.
Secondly, country and global policy makers and donors should
demand and fund the acquisition of better evidence on what
is a complex and rapidly evolving arena. What is now needed
are coordinated evaluations using multiple methods in order
to assess and understand the combined effects of GHIs and
how they work alongside longer-standing disease-control
financing mechanisms. Given the rapid learning of GHIs,
which is often but not always applied, continuous monitoring
and independent evaluations are needed to track changes
and identify refractory problems. Early evaluations have been
generally descriptive, necessary because of the rapid evolution
in the GHI arena. Now, more analytical health policy and
health systems evaluations are needed.
We believe this review of evidence on the early national
effects of GHIs is timely, in advance of dissemination
of findings in 2009 from the Global Fund Five Year
Evaluation (http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/terg/five_
year_evaluation/), the Global HIV/AIDS Initiatives Network
(GHIN – http://www.ghinet.org)3 and the recent WHO-
launched initiative ‘Maximising Positive Synergies between
health systems and GHIs’ (WHO 2008). Syntheses and
interpretation of findings from these different evaluations—
on a country-by-country basis—could provide invaluable
lessons on how a much more complex mix of funding for
disease control and health systems strengthening can work
together in a complementary way to support country-led
efforts to roll back the HIV and AIDS epidemic. They could
also provide lessons for the establishment of effective long-
term, comprehensive monitoring and evaluation systems.
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Endnotes
1 MAP was small relative to the total annual amounts provided by the
Global Fund and PEPFAR, which had become the major external
funder of HIV/AIDS control in sub-Saharan Africa by 2007
(Oomman et al. 2007). However, MAP was the first of these new
GHIs for funding HIV/AIDS control, whose impact on countries’
health systems was experienced and reported across 2002–07.
2 Our initial review used the following Boolean string: (global health
initiatives OR global health partnership OR public-private partner-
ship OR Global Fund OR PEPFAR OR World Bank MAP) AND
(HIV/AIDS) AND (effects OR national policy OR financial flow
OR public-private partnerships OR planning and coordination
OR implementation and monitoring and evaluation OR human
resources).
3 The Global HIV/AIDS Initiatives Network (GHIN) is examining the
effects and the inter-relationships of the three global health
initiatives. GHIN has its origins in the Global Fund Tracking Study
(2003–04), and in the SWEF studies (2005–06), which together
provided several of the studies and papers reviewed.
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